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A FATHER’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN GEORGIA 
JUVENILE COURT LEGITIMATION 




A parent’s right to the care and custody of his or her child has been 
universally regarded as fundamental and deserving of protection.1 
Recognizing the significance of this “fiercely guarded” right,2 when 
the State seeks to terminate parental rights in juvenile court, Georgia 
law accords parents an array of procedural safeguards designed to 
protect that interest3—among them, the right to an attorney in a 
termination proceeding.4 By the time a deprivation case reaches the 
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 1. E.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (“[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, 
and control of their children.”); see also Elizabeth Mills Viney, Comment, The Right to Counsel in 
Parental-Rights Termination Cases: How a Clear and Consistent Legal Standard Would Better Protect 
Indigent Families, 63 SMU L. REV. 1403, 1403 (2010). 
 2. In re J.M.B., 676 S.E.2d 9, 12 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (“[W]hen the State is terminating a parent’s 
‘fundamental and fiercely guarded right’ to his or her child, although technically done in a civil 
proceeding, the total and erroneous denial of appointed counsel during the termination hearing is 
presumptively harmful because it calls into question the very structural integrity of the fact-finding 
process.” (quoting Nix v. Dep’t of Human Res., 225 S.E.2d 306, 307 (Ga. 1976))). 
 3.  See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4 (Supp. 2011), § 15-11-96 (2012) (requiring personal service of summons 
and petition to parties to a juvenile court termination of parental rights proceeding at least thirty days 
prior to the hearing date); id. § 15-11-39.1 (allowing parties to a juvenile court proceeding—including a 
proceeding to terminate parental rights—to be served by publication only if the court finds the 
complaining party was unable to ascertain the responding party’s address or whereabouts after 
reasonable efforts); id. § 15-11-99 (requiring a juvenile court’s finding that termination of parental 
rights is in a child’s best interests to be supported by clear and convincing evidence); In re C.S., 644 
S.E.2d 812, 812–13 (Ga. 2007) (finding insufficient service of process where a parent residing out of 
state, who had not waived service, was not personally served but instead received summons via certified 
mail); Taylor v. Padgett, 684 S.E.2d 434, 436 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (finding service by publication was 
improper where the party alleging deprivation failed to utilize available channels of communication to 
serve a parent who was living in a truck); In re C.I.W., 494 S.E.2d 291, 293–94 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) 
(holding personal service of summons that did not include a copy of the petition to terminate parental 
rights was constitutionally inadequate and violated Georgia law). 
 4. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-98(b) (2012). In any proceeding terminating parental rights, “[i]f the parent or 
1
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termination phase, the juvenile court has already found that the 
parent in question has subjected his or her child to abuse or neglect 
so severe that the child could not have remained in the parent’s home 
without seriously jeopardizing the child’s welfare.5 Nonetheless, the 
parent retains his or her right to an attorney because severing an 
individual’s relationship with his or her child is considered “a tearing 
of the flesh” only to be done by the courts “under the most carefully 
controlled and regulated circumstances.”6 
However, under current Georgia law, this right does not extend to 
biological fathers of children born out of wedlock who have not 
rendered their relationships with their children “legitimate” through 
applicable statutory procedures.7 Unlike biological mothers and 
fathers of children born in wedlock, biological fathers who have not 
                                                                                                                 
parents of the child desire to be represented by counsel but are indigent, the court shall appoint an 
attorney for such parent or parents, which shall be a charge upon the funds of the county upon 
certification thereof by the court . . . .” Id.; see also In re J.M.B., 676 S.E.2d at 12. 
 5. After an initial authorization for emergency removal, a juvenile court must hold a hearing 
finding a child to be deprived in order to remove the child from his or her parents’ custody. See 
O.C.G.A. § 15-11-55 (a) (2012); DANETTE JOSLYN-GAUL, GEORGIA’S RESPONSIBILITIES TOWARD 
CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE: A REFERENCE MANUAL 36 (Karen Worthington ed., 2004), available at 
http://bartoncenter.net/uploads/fall2011updates/dependency/Ga-responsibility.pdf. 
Georgia law defines a “deprived child” as a child who is “without proper parental care or control, 
subsistence, [or] education as required by law, or other care or control necessary for the child’s physical, 
mental, or emotional health or morals.” O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8) (2012). “A [juvenile] court’s order 
removing a child from [the parents’] home [must] be based upon a finding . . . that continuation in the 
home would be contrary to the welfare of the child.” Id. § 15-11-58(a). Absent a few statutorily 
enumerated exceptions, after a child is removed, the Department of Human Resources, Division of 
Family and Children Services (DFCS) is required to provide the parent(s) with reunification services to 
address the causes of deprivation. See O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58(h) (2012). In these cases, DFCS may only 
pursue termination of a parent’s rights if he or she fails to correct the causes of deprivation through 
reunification services. However, even if reunification services are not required, DFCS would not file a 
motion requesting termination of a parent’s rights until after a court had adjudicated the child deprived 
and removed the child from the parents’ custody. Telephone Interview with the Honorable Timothy 
Pape, Ga. Juvenile Court Judge (July 8, 2011). 
 6. In re J.M.B., 676 S.E.2d at 11; In re P.D.W., 674 S.E.2d 338, 341 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). In In re 
P.D.W., the Georgia Court of Appeals acknowledged overwhelming evidence that a mother’s chronic, 
un-rehabilitated drug use, unemployment, and unstable housing rendered her incapable of providing 
proper care for her children. Id. Despite this finding, the court vacated an order terminating the mother’s 
parental rights because her limited intellectual capacity called into question whether her waiver of 
counsel was both intelligent and voluntary. Id. 
 7. O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22 (2012). A father of a child born out of wedlock may render the child 
legitimate through petitioning and obtaining an order of legitimation from the superior court in the 
county where the child’s mother or legal guardian resides, the superior court in the county where an 
adoption of the child is pending, or the juvenile court where deprivation proceedings concerning the 
child are pending. Id. 
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legitimated their children have no right to court-appointed counsel in 
juvenile court termination proceedings.8 Moreover, these fathers are 
denied all rights to challenge these proceedings on any basis.9 
To obtain standing to contest a termination petition, a father must 
legitimate his child.10 When a child is in DFCS custody, a father 
typically begins this process by filing a petition for legitimation in 
the juvenile court where the deprivation action is pending.11 In the 
legitimation proceeding that follows, the father has the burden of 
proof to establish both biological paternity and that he has 
demonstrated the necessary level of commitment to the child.12 
Because a denial of the legitimation petition eliminates the father’s 
right to contest a later termination of his parental rights,13 the 
significance of this decision is extraordinary. Yet, while a legal 
parent’s right to counsel in termination of parental rights proceedings 
is undisputed,14 in Georgia, a biological father has no established 
                                                                                                                 
 8. See, e.g., In re J.S., 691 S.E.2d 250, 251 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (dismissing a biological father’s 
argument that he was denied the right to counsel in termination proceedings as moot because—due to 
the juvenile court’s denial of his petition to legitimate his child—he had no standing to contest a 
termination of his parental rights). 
 9.  O.C.G.A. § 15-11-96(i) (2012). A biological father who is not the legal father of a child may not 
object to the termination of his parental rights if he does not file a petition to legitimate the child within 
specified time frame or if, after filing such a petition, the action is dismissed for failure to prosecute or is 
otherwise denied or concluded without a court order finding that he is the child’s legal father. Id. 
 10. Georgia Juvenile Code section 15-11-96(i) provides: 
A biological father who is not the legal father loses all rights to the child and the court 
shall enter an order terminating all such father’s rights to the child and such father may 
not thereafter object to the termination of his rights to the child if within 30 days from his 
receipt of the notice provided for in subsection (e) of this Code section he: (1) Does not 
file a legitimation petition and give notice as required in subsection (h) of this Code 
section; (2) Files a legitimation petition which is subsequently dismissed for failure to 
prosecute; or (3) Files a legitimation petition and the action is subsequently concluded 
without a court order declaring a finding that he is the legal father of the child. 
O.C.G.A. § 15-11-96(i) (2012). 
 11. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 12. When deciding whether to grant a biological father’s petition for legitimation, a court “must 
initially determine whether the father has abandoned his opportunity interest to develop a relationship 
with the child.” In re L.S.T., 649 S.E.2d 841, 842 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Smith v. Soligon, 561 
S.E.2d 850 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002)). “If the juvenile court concludes that the father has abandoned his 
opportunity interest, that finding is sufficient to end the court’s inquiry and justifies the denial of the 
legitimation petition.” Id. 
 13.  O.C.G.A. § 15-11-96(i) (2012). 
 14. See supra note 4 and accompanying text; cf. COUNCIL OF JUVENILE COURT JUDGES OF GEORGIA, 
BENCHBOOK ch. IX (2013), available at http://www.georgiacourts.org/councils/cjcj/PDF/Benchbook% 
20Chapters/ch09.PDF (“Because of the significant issues in termination of parental rights cases, some 
3
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right to counsel in legitimation proceedings despite the gravity of the 
interest at stake.15 In essence, denying putative fathers the right to 
counsel in legitimation proceedings provides a mechanism by which 
juvenile courts may deprive them of their fundamental liberty interest 
in parenting their children without due process. 
In re J.S. illustrates the issue.16 In J.S., a child’s biological father 
filed a petition to legitimate his son in the Juvenile Court of Spalding 
County, where a termination action was pending.17 The legitimation 
proceeding was scheduled to take place in conjunction with the 
termination hearing, and after informing the court that he was 
indigent, the father requested the court appoint counsel to represent 
him in both matters.18 Acknowledging concern over conducting the 
termination hearing without appointing counsel for the father, the 
court elected to postpone the termination and proceeded only on the 
legitimation hearing, denying the father’s request for counsel in that 
hearing.19 Despite the mother’s consent to the legitimation, the court 
denied the petition and entered an order terminating the father’s 
parental rights without a hearing, finding that the denial of the 
legitimation petition deprived him of standing to contest the 
termination.20 Thus, in denying the legitimation petition, the court 
was able to avoid even holding a termination proceeding as to the 
                                                                                                                 
judges appoint attorneys to represent the interests of parents who cannot be personally served, even 
absent a request.”). 
 15. See Alexander v. Guthrie, 454 S.E.2d 805, 806–07 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (finding an indigent 
father had no right to court-appointed counsel in a legitimation proceeding brought in superior court); In 
re J.S., 691 S.E.2d 250, 252 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (citing Alexander, 454 S.E.2d at 805) (finding a father 
was not entitled to an attorney to represent him at public expense in a juvenile court legitimation 
proceeding). But cf. Wilkins v. Ga. Dep’t of Human Res., 337 S.E.2d 20 (Ga. 1985) (holding that a 
putative father was a party to deprivation proceedings within the meaning of the Georgia statute and, as 
such, was entitled to representation at all stages of the proceedings, including a hearing to establish 
paternity); In re S.M.G., 643 S.E.2d 296 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Taylor Auto Grp. v. Jessie, 527 
S.E.2d 256 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999)) (declining to examine the merit of a biological father’s contention that 
an order terminating his parental rights should be vacated because the juvenile court failed to appoint 
him counsel in a legitimation proceeding, given his failure to raise the issue at trial). 
 16. In re J.S., 691 S.E.2d at 250. 
 17. Id. at 251. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 251–52 (“Despite his request, the father ‘was not entitled to have an attorney appointed to 
represent him at public expense in the legitimation proceedings.’” (quoting Alexander, 454 S.E.2d at 
806)). 
 20. Id. 
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father, where he would have been entitled to court-appointed 
counsel.21 
This Note examines whether denying a putative father22 the right 
to counsel in the context of juvenile court legitimation proceedings 
amounts to a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due 
process because of the state’s direct role in depriving him of a 
fundamental liberty interest in the care and custody of his children. 
Part I examines the procedure by which a father of a child born out of 
wedlock may legitimate his child under Georgia law and describes 
parents’ right to counsel in juvenile court termination proceedings.23 
Part II explores the current state of the law regarding a putative 
father’s right to counsel in these proceedings.24 Part II also considers 
the constitutionality of denying a biological father the right to 
counsel in contested legitimation proceedings in light of Georgia and 
United States Supreme Court precedent on the issues of standards of 
proof in legitimation actions and due process requirements accorded 
to parents in termination proceedings.25 Part III proposes that the 
Georgia General Assembly amend the Georgia Juvenile Code to 
require appointment of counsel to putative fathers in contested 
legitimation proceedings.26 
I. LEGITIMATION AND TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS IN 
GEORGIA 
A. Legitimation Procedure In Juvenile Court Deprivation Cases 
Under Georgia law, a child born out of wedlock is not the legal 
child of his or her biological father.27 Unless the biological father 
                                                                                                                 
 21. See supra notes 4, 8 and accompanying text. 
 22. A putative father is an unmarried father who has not legitimated the child or been declared the 
child’s father in a paternity action. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 611 (9th ed. 2009). 
 23. See discussion infra Part I. 
 24. See discussion infra Part II. 
 25. See discussion infra Part II. 
 26. See discussion infra Part III. 
 27. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(10.1) (2012). In the context of juvenile court deprivation proceedings, a 
“legal father” is defined as “a male who has . . . legally adopted a child; . . . [w]as married to the 
biological mother of that child at the time the child was conceived or was born . . .;” married the child’s 
biological mother after the child’s birth and “recognized the child as his own;” or “has legitimated the 
5
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subsequently marries the child’s mother, he must either 
administratively legitimate the child or petition a court of competent 
jurisdiction to become the child’s legal father.28 Although the 
administrative legitimation procedure provides putative fathers the 
opportunity to establish legal fatherhood by signing a voluntary 
acknowledgement of legitimation with the written consent of the 
child’s mother, the acknowledgement has no legal consequence 
unless it is executed during the first year of a child’s life.29 
Additionally, contrary to the belief of many Georgians (and unlike in 
many other states),30 being listed as the father on the child’s birth 
                                                                                                                 
child” pursuant to procedures set forth in Georgia Code section 19-7-22 or 19-7-21.1. Id. See generally 
DAN E. MCCONAUGHEY, GEORGIA DIVORCE, ALIMONY AND CHILD CUSTODY § 25:6 (2011–2012 ed.). 
The mother of a child born out of wedlock is the only legally recognized parent unless and until the 
child’s biological father brings a legitimation action to render the child legitimate. Id. 
 28. Georgia provides two methods by which a putative father may legitimate his child: (1) by 
petitioning the superior court in the county where the child’s legal parent or guardian resides or where 
an adoption action is pending; or by petitioning the juvenile court in the county where a deprivation 
action concerning the child is pending; and (2) through signing a voluntary acknowledgement of 
legitimation with the consent of the mother during the child’s first year of life. O.C.G.A. §§ 19-7-22, 19-
7-21.1 (2010); see also In re T.W., 654 S.E.2d 218, 220 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (reversing a juvenile 
court’s order requiring father to submit to genetic testing to establish his paternity because, in having 
signed a voluntary acknowledgement of legitimation pursuant to Georgia Code sections 19-7-21.1 and 
19-7-46.1, he had already established his legal status with respect to the children). 
 29. Georgia Code section 19-7-21.1 provides: 
Prior to the child’s first birthday, a father of a child born out of wedlock may render his 
relationship with the child legitimate when both the mother and father have freely agreed, 
consented, and signed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity and an acknowledgment 
of legitimation which have been made and have not been rescinded pursuant to Code 
Section 19-7-46.1. . . . [A] [v]oluntary acknowledgment of legitimation shall not be 
recognized if: . . . [t]he child is one year of age or older. 
O.C.G.A. § 19-7-21.1(b)–(c) (2010). 
 30. Several states require putative fathers of children born out of wedlock to execute 
acknowledgments of paternity as a prerequisite to being listed as the child’s father on the birth 
certificate. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-401(f)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Fiscal Sess.) (“If 
the mother was not married at the time of either conception or birth[,] . . . the name of the father shall 
not be entered on the certificate of birth without an affidavit of paternity signed by the mother and the 
person to be named as the father. . . .”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-63-165 (West, Westlaw through 2012 
Reg. Sess.). Because the acknowledgments establish legal fatherhood in those states, being listed as the 
father on the child’s birth certificate is proof of legal fatherhood. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-
120(a) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Fiscal Sess.) (“A man is the father of a child for all intents and 
purposes if he and the mother execute an acknowledgment of paternity of the child . . . .”); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 63-17-50 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.). While this is not the case in Georgia, many 
fathers believe that being listed on their child’s birth certificate establishes legal fatherhood. See, e.g., In 
re E.D.T., 505 S.E.2d 516, 518 n.4 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (addressing a biological father’s claim that he 
believed he was the child’s legal father because he signed the child’s birth certificate). 
6
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certificate or obtaining a court order establishing paternity does not 
establish legal fatherhood.31 
The question of a putative father’s legal standing typically arises 
either in the context of custody disputes between the biological father 
and the mother or other relative of the child, or in juvenile court 
deprivation proceedings.32 In deprivation proceedings,33 juvenile 
courts generally require that putative fathers of children born out of 
wedlock establish paternity and legitimate the child as part of a court-
ordered case plan for reunification.34 This requirement is important 
                                                                                                                 
 31. A mother who is seeking child support for a child whose paternity is contested must obtain a 
court order establishing the putative father’s biological paternity and duty to support the child. See 
O.C.G.A. § 19-7-49(a) (2010). While this paternity order constitutes proof of biological fatherhood, it 
does not provide a father with any legal rights as to the child, and its “sole effect” is to establish a 
father’s duty to support the child. Id.; see also Rodriguez v. Nunez, 555 S.E.2d 514, 518 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2001) (finding, in the context of a probate matter, that a child’s mother could not seek a determination of 
paternity in order to establish her son’s right to inherit from his deceased father because the sole purpose 
of a paternity action under Georgia Code section 19-7-49 is to establish a father’s duty to support a 
child). 
 32. See MCCONAUGHEY, supra note 27, § 11:65 (noting custody challenges, juvenile court 
deprivation proceedings, and contested adoptions among the contexts in which petitions for legitimation 
are brought). 
 33. To initiate a deprivation action, the complainant must file a petition alleging that the children 
named in the petition are deprived, after which the court will schedule and hold an adjudication hearing. 
O.C.G.A. § 15-11-35 (2012). This hearing must take place within ten days if the child has already been 
placed in DFCS custody pursuant to an emergency removal and subsequent probable cause 
determination. Id. § 15-11-55(a)(2)(D). If the court adjudicates the child deprived, it may order that the 
child remain in DFCS custody (or be placed in DFCS custody if the child was not previously removed), 
be placed in the custody of a third party, or issue a protective order allowing the child to remain in the 
home under specific guidelines. Id. § 15-11-55(a). If the child remains in DFCS custody or under court-
ordered supervision, the juvenile court will continue to oversee the case to ensure that the causes of 
deprivation are remedied or, in the alternative, that another permanent living arrangement for the child is 
secured. See generally id. § 15-11-58. 
 34. See, e.g., In re M.D.N., 657 S.E.2d 594, 596 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008); In re S.M.G., 643 S.E.2d 296, 
297 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007); In re A.J., 654 S.E.2d 465, 466–67 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007); In re E.D.T., 505 
S.E.2d at 517. In In re of S.M.G., in an order terminating a biological father’s parental rights, the 
juvenile court found that ever since the children had been initially adjudicated deprived, the court had 
“repeatedly” informed the biological father of his responsibility to legitimate, yet he had failed to do so. 
In re S.M.G., 643 S.E.2d at 297. In In re E.D.T., the court found that a biological father’s responsibility 
to legitimate his child was included as a goal in his DFCS case plan for reunification and that the father 
acknowledged that his DFCS caseworker had instructed him to file a legitimation petition on several 
occasions. In re E.D.T., 505 S.E.2d at 517. Similarly, in In re A.J., a biological father’s case plan 
required him to legitimate his child, among other goals. In re A.J., 654 S.E.2d at 466–67. In In re 
M.D.N., the father’s case plan, filed with the juvenile court and bearing his signature, required that he 
legitimate his child. Both the seventy-two-hour hearing order and order of adjudication included 
findings that the father would have “no rights” until he legitimated his child. In re M.D.N., 657 S.E.2d at 
596. 
7
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for two reasons. First, in the context of reunification proceedings35—
without serious legal acrobatics—a juvenile court cannot give legal 
custody of a child to a biological father who has not legitimated.36 
Second, as previously stated, a putative father who has not 
legitimated his child has no standing to object to a termination of his 
parental rights.37 
B. Evaluating Legitimation Claims Based On Fathers’ Asserted 
Relationship Interest 
While a child’s biological mother is automatically his or her legal 
mother unless her rights are terminated or surrendered, a biological 
father must prove more than genetic paternity to establish legal 
fatherhood.38 As a threshold question, a court must determine 
whether the biological father has abandoned his opportunity interest 
                                                                                                                 
 35. When a deprived child is removed from his or her home and placed in DFCS custody, the 
Department is required to make reasonable efforts to reunify the child with his or her parents unless the 
court finds that reunification efforts would be detrimental to the child. See generally O.C.G.A. § 15-11-
58 (2012). These efforts center around a case plan for reunification—developed by the Department and 
approved by the court—that addresses the causes of deprivation through specific behavioral goals and 
required participation in appropriate community-based services. Id. § 15-11-58(c). The juvenile court 
conducts periodic review hearings to oversee compliance with the court-ordered plan and determine 
whether reunification remains in the child’s best interest. Id. § 15-11-58. When a parent has successfully 
addressed all the issues that led to the child’s removal, the juvenile court may terminate the 
Department’s legal custody of the child and return the child to the legal custody of his or her parent(s). 
See id. § 15-11-58.1(b); JOSLYN-GAUL, supra note 5, at 43–47. 
 36. In re A.D., 648 S.E.2d 786, 786 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (finding a biological father had no standing 
to request custody in juvenile court absent proof that he had legitimated his child); JOHN C. MAYOUE, 8 
GEORGIA JURISPRUDENCE: FAMILY LAW § 9:10 (2006) (“The father of a child born out-of-wedlock has 
no right to custody of that child . . . unless the father legitimizes the child as provided for by statute.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 37. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-96(i) (2012); see also In re C.G., 658 S.E.2d 448, 456 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008); In 
re S.M.G., 643 S.E.2d at 297. A father whose legitimation action was concluded without a determination 
that he was the legal father of the child had no standing to object to termination of his parental rights. In 
re C.G., 658 S.E.2d at 456. A putative father’s failure to file a legitimation petition warranted 
termination of his parental rights. In re S.M.G., 643 S.E.2d at 297. 
 38. See In re Baby Girl Eason, 358 S.E.2d 459 (Ga. 1987). In evaluating a father’s petition to 
legitimate his child, a court must initially determine whether he has abandoned his opportunity interest 
in developing a relationship with the child. Id. at 462. If the court finds that he has abandoned his 
opportunity interest, the court may deny his petition without a finding of parental unfitness, so long as 
the denial is in the child’s best interests. Id. If a father has not abandoned his opportunity interest in 
developing a relationship with his child, a court is only justified in denying his petition to legitimate if it 
finds he is an unfit parent. Id.; see also Bowers v. Pearson, 609 S.E.2d 174 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) 
(reiterating the standard established in Eason). 
8
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in developing a relationship with the child.39 If it determines that he 
has, the court may end the inquiry and deny the petition.40 If the court 
finds the father has not abandoned his opportunity interest, in actions 
where the state has interfered with the parent–child relationship, the 
court applies the parental fitness standard to determine whether the 
father should be permitted to legitimate the child.41 
The parental fitness standard considers whether the putative father 
is fit to have custody of his child, regardless of whether available 
alternatives—such as allowing the child to be adopted by another 
party—would better serve the child’s interest.42 If the court 
determines the father is fit, it is required to grant the legitimation.43 If 
the state is not involved, the court considers the totality of the 
circumstances to determine whether to apply a parental fitness or best 
interests of the child standard.44 Under the best interests standard, the 
court has discretionary authority to decide whether granting the 
petition would be in the child’s best interests, regardless of whether 
the putative father is fit to have custody.45 Although many have 
                                                                                                                 
 39. The Georgia Supreme Court explained: 
[U]nwed fathers gain from their biological connection with a child an opportunity interest 
to develop a relationship with their children which is constitutionally protected. This 
opportunity interest begins at conception and endures probably throughout the minority 
of the child. But it is not indestructible. It may be lost . . . if not timely pursued. On the 
other hand it is an interest which an unwed father has a right to pursue through his 
commitment to becoming a father in a true relational sense as well as in a biological 
sense. Absent abandonment of his interest, a state may not deny a biological father a 
reasonable opportunity to establish a relationship with his child. 
Eason, 358 S.E.2d at 462. 
 40. In re L.S.T., 649 S.E.2d 841 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007); MARK H. MURPHY, GEORGIA JUVENILE 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE WITH FORMS § 8:16 (5th ed. 2012). 
 41. Eason, 358 S.E.2d at 459. 
 42. Id. at 463. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Davis v. LaBrec, 549 S.E.2d 76, 77 (Ga. 2001) (“[A]bsent the State’s involvement and under 
other circumstances, the best interests of the child standard would be adequate.”). For instance, the court 
may apply a best interests standard in a situation where the state is not involved and a putative father 
seeks to establish his paternity of a child who already has a legal father (because the child was born to a 
woman who was married to a man who was not the child’s biological father) with an established 
relationship to that child. Id. Additionally, a best interests test is adequate where an unwed father seeks 
to challenge the adoption of his child by the child’s stepfather. Eason, 358 S.E.2d at 463. 
 45. Like many other states, Georgia does not provide a statutory definition for the “best interests of 
the child” standard. In determining whether granting a legitimation petition is in the child’s best 
interests, the court has broad discretion to consider whatever factors it deems appropriate and relevant. 
See Susan Nauss Exon, The Best Interest of the Child: Going Beyond Legalese to Empathize with a 
9
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questioned the fundamental fairness of imposing heightened proof 
requirements on fathers,46 the practice has stood up to constitutional 
challenges in both the United States and Georgia Supreme Courts.47 
C. Right To Counsel In Termination Of Parental Rights Proceedings 
While the United States Supreme Court has recognized that 
termination of parental rights proceedings implicate a fundamental 
liberty interest that requires protection by clear procedural 
safeguards,48 it has not found that due process requires the 
appointment of counsel to indigent parents in every termination 
case.49 Nonetheless, given the fundamental nature of parents’ right to 
the care and custody of their children, the Supreme Court has 
expressed doubts as to whether terminating a parent’s rights without 
a showing of parental unfitness would be constitutional.50 
                                                                                                                 
Client’s Leap of Faith, 24 J. JUV. L. 1, 3 (2004). 
 46. Laura Oren, Unmarried Fathers and Adoption: “Perfecting” or “Abandoning” an Opportunity 
Interest, 36 CAP. U. L. REV. 253 (2007) (examining Supreme Court precedent regarding the so-called 
“biology plus” standard as articulated in a series of cases where the constitutionality of the standard was 
challenged on various grounds); see also discussion infra Part II.B. 
 47. See, e.g., Eason, 358 S.E.2d 459. The constitutionality of Georgia’s legitimation statute has been 
upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978). 
 48. In Santosky v. Kramer, the Court explained: 
Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing 
the irretrievable destruction of their family life. If anything, persons faced with forced 
dissolution of their parental rights have a more critical need for procedural protections 
than do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs. When the State 
moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with 
fundamentally fair procedures. 
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753–54 (1982). 
 49. The Court has not considered an indigent parent’s right to counsel in termination of parental 
rights (TPR) proceedings since Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham County, more than 
three decades ago. 452 U.S. 18 (1981). In Lassiter, while the Court recognized that a parent’s right to 
the “‘companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children’ is an important interest that 
‘undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection,’” it found that 
denying a parent’s right to counsel in termination proceedings would not constitute a due process 
violation in every circumstance. Id. at 27 (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)). 
Instead, the Court explained that whether a denial of counsel in termination proceedings violates due 
process must be examined in light of the specific facts and circumstances in each case. Id. at 30. The 
Lassiter Court held that in the case before it, where the child’s mother had not even demonstrated an 
interest in appearing at the custody hearing, the lower court did not err in failing to appoint counsel. Id. 
at 33. 
 50. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 760 n.10 (“Nor is it clear that the State constitutionally could terminate 
a parent’s rights without showing parental unfitness.”); Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255 (“We have little doubt 
that the Due Process Clause would be offended ‘[i]f a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a 
10
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Recognizing the gravity of an order of termination, almost every 
state accords indigent parents a statutory right to court-appointed 
counsel in these proceedings.51 Georgia is no exception.52 Moreover, 
Georgia courts have consistently held that failure to provide counsel 
for an indigent parent in a termination proceeding mandates reversal 
of an order of termination, regardless of the weight of the State’s 
evidence of abuse or neglect.53 In so doing, these courts have 
recognized the principle articulated by the United States Supreme 
Court in Santosky v. Kramer that “[t]he fundamental liberty interest 
of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child 
does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents 
or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State.”54 
It follows then that this fundamental interest deserves no less 
recognition when asserted by fathers of children born out of wedlock, 
simply because their failure to legitimate their children prior to the 
commencement of deprivation proceedings renders them something 
less than “model parents.” Nonetheless, because putative fathers are 
required to legitimate their children to have standing to contest a 
                                                                                                                 
natural family, over the objections of the parents and their children, without some showing of unfitness 
and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children’s best interest.’” (quoting Smith v. 
Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862–63 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring))). 
 51. See Susan Calkins, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Parental-Rights Termination Cases: The 
Challenge for Appellate Courts, 6 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 179, 184 (2004) (“Almost every state 
provides counsel to indigent parents either through public defender offices, a system of appointed 
counsel, or contracts with groups of attorneys.”); see also 2 ANN M. HARALAMBIE, HANDLING CHILD 
CUSTODY, ABUSE AND ADOPTION CASES § 13:6 (3d ed. 2009). While most states provide a statutory 
right to counsel for indigent parents in termination of parental rights proceedings, some states accord 
this right through common law. Id. Only five states—Delaware, Hawaii, Tennessee, Wyoming, and 
South Carolina—do not provide indigent parents with a mandatory statutory right to counsel in TPR 
proceedings. Iokona Baker & Faye Kimura, Access to Justice: Parents’ Right to Counsel in Termination 
of Parental Rights Cases, HAW. BUS. J., Dec. 2008, at 11, 12. 
 52.  See O.C.G.A. § 15-11-98(b) (2012). 
 53. See, e.g., In re J.M.B., 676 S.E.2d 9, 12–13 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009); In re P.D.W., 674 S.E.2d 338, 
340 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). In In re P.D.W., the Georgia Court of Appeals determined that DFCS had 
presented sufficient evidence to support the lower court’s determination that termination was in the 
children’s best interests. Id. Nonetheless, because the juvenile court failed to appoint counsel to the 
purportedly indigent mother because she had not requested it prior to the hearing, the Court of Appeals 
vacated the termination order. Id. at 348. 
 54. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); see also, e.g., In re A.M.A., 
607 S.E.2d 916, 922–23 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (comparing an indigent parent’s right to counsel in TPR 
proceedings to that of a criminal defendant and characterizing the right as constitutional in nature). 
11
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termination55 and since a juvenile court’s denial of a father’s 
legitimation petition establishes an absolute requirement that the 
court grant a pending petition to terminate his parental rights,56 
denying counsel to a putative father in a juvenile court legitimation 
proceeding has the same effect as denying him counsel in a 
termination proceeding. 
II. DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS IN CONTEXT 
A. Procedural Due Process Requirements In Parental Rights Cases 
Where The State Is An Actor 
In Santosky v. Kramer, the United States Supreme Court 
recognized that parents have a constitutionally protected liberty 
interest in the custody of their children that is “far more precious than 
any property right.”57 In determining that the need to terminate 
parental rights must be established by “clear and convincing 
evidence,” the Court observed that parents’ right to custody is not 
diminished because the children were deprived in their care.58 To the 
contrary, where parents face a termination of their parental rights, 
they have an even greater need for procedural protections.59 
                                                                                                                 
 55. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-96(h) (2012). 
 56. Id. § 15-11-96(i). If a father fails to successfully legitimate his child within the required time 
frame, “the court shall enter an order terminating all such father’s rights to the child . . . .” Id. (emphasis 
added); see also In re D.W., 592 S.E.2d 679, 681 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (“In the absence of standing to 
object to the termination of parental rights for an untimely filed legitimation petition, entry of an order 
terminating parental rights [is] mandatory.”); MURPHY, supra note 40, § 6:8. Murphy clarifies: 
When a putative father fails to timely file and pursue his legitimation petition in 
keeping with the requirements of O.C.G.A. section 15-11-96, the juvenile court is 
required to terminate his parental rights. The trial court has no discretion to grant a 
putative father more time to file for legitimation than the 30 days allowed by statute. 
Moreover, after the expiration of 30 days, the father loses standing to make any 
arguments in connection with the termination of his parental rights. 
Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
 57. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758–59. 
 58. Id. at 753 (explaining that even if the State has taken custody of their children, parents retain a 
“vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life”). 
 59. Id. (“If anything, persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental rights have a more 
critical need for procedural protections than do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family 
affairs.”). 
12
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 4
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol29/iss3/4
2013] FATHER’S RIGHTS IN GEORGIA LEGITIMATION PROCEEDINGS 877 
In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham County, 
the Supreme Court declined to hold that the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment requires that states appoint counsel to 
indigent parents in every termination case, yet the Court explicitly 
acknowledged that in many circumstances, a parent’s asserted liberty 
interest in the parent–child relationship is significant enough to 
require appointment of counsel.60 Acknowledging that termination of 
parental rights must be “accomplished by procedures meeting the 
requisites of the Due Process Clause,”61 the Court held that because 
the mother in Lassiter failed to demonstrate any interest in contesting 
the termination, due process was not offended by the juvenile court’s 
failure to appoint counsel.62 Nonetheless, the Court specifically 
praised the wisdom of statutes requiring appointment of counsel in all 
termination proceedings, although such requirements impose higher 
standards than “those minimally tolerable under the Constitution.”63 
Recognizing the importance of the liberty interest at stake in 
termination proceedings, Georgia has enacted such a statute.64 
Georgia courts have consistently protected parents’ due process 
rights in this context, requiring strict construction of the statute 
                                                                                                                 
 60. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cnty., 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981) (“If, in a given case, 
the parent’s interests were at their strongest, the State’s interests were at their weakest . . . it could not be 
said that . . . due process did not therefore require the appointment of counsel.”). 
 61. Id. at 37. 
 62. Id. at 33. The Court noted that the unrepresented mother had not even bothered to appear at a 
prior custody hearing and had failed, without cause, to attempt to contest the termination of her parental 
rights. Id. 
 63. Id. at 33. The Court explained: 
A wise public policy, however, may require that higher standards be adopted than those 
minimally tolerable under the Constitution. Informed opinion has clearly come to hold 
that an indigent parent is entitled to the assistance of appointed counsel not only in 
parental termination proceedings, but also in dependency and neglect proceedings as 
well. Most significantly, 33 States and the District of Columbia provide statutorily for the 
appointment of counsel in termination cases. The Court’s opinion today in no way 
implies that the standards increasingly urged by informed public opinion and now widely 
followed by the States are other than enlightened and wise. 
Id. at 33–34 (citations omitted). 
 64. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-98 (2012). Before this code section was enacted, courts construed Georgia 
Code section 15-11-6(b) (formerly section 15-11-30(b))—which extends the right to counsel to parties 
in deprivation proceedings—to provide for parents’ right to counsel in termination of parental rights 
proceedings. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-6 (2012), construed in Wilkins v. Ga. Dep’t of Human Res., 337 S.E.2d 
20, 24 (Ga. 1985). 
13
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conferring the right to counsel.65 Furthermore, Georgia courts have 
gone so far as to apply additional procedural safeguards to 
termination proceedings, even when not explicitly provided by 
statute.66 For example, in Nix v. Georgia Department of Human 
Resources, the Georgia Supreme Court held that a mother who 
appealed a termination of her parental rights was entitled to receive a 
transcript of the proceeding at the state’s expense.67 Although the 
Georgia Code did not explicitly so require, the court found that 
denying the mother a pauperized transcript would directly contradict 
the legislature’s intent to protect a parent’s “fundamental and fiercely 
guarded” rights to his or her child by securing effective 
representation at “all stages of any proceeding involving the 
termination of that parent’s right to his or her child.”68 
B. Due Process Requirements In Putative Fathers’ Parentage Claims 
Both the United States and Georgia Supreme Courts have 
recognized that a biological father’s parental rights accord 
diminished protection if he makes no attempt to develop a 
relationship with his child.69 Nonetheless, absent a showing that a 
                                                                                                                 
 65. See, e.g., In re J.M.B., 676 S.E.2d 9, 12 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (overruling precedent requiring that 
a parent erroneously denied counsel in a termination proceeding establish harm in order to prevail on an 
appeal because such a requirement “does not comport with the [Georgia] Supreme Court’s directive that 
we guarantee ‘the most stringent procedural safeguards’ in termination cases” (quoting Sanchez v. 
Walker Cnty. Dep’t of Family & Children Servs., 229 S.E.2d 66, 70 (Ga. 1976))). 
 66. E.g., Nix v. Dep’t of Human Res., 225 S.E.2d 306, 308 (Ga. 1976). Similarly, in Thorne v. 
Padgett, the Georgia Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a statute preventing a parent 
who had failed to provide financial support for his child from challenging adoption proceedings where 
the state was not involved. Thorne v. Padgett, 386 S.E.2d 155, 155 (Ga. 1989) (construing O.C.G.A. 
§ 19-8-6(b) (1986)). In Thorne, the court found that preventing a challenge to adoption proceedings was, 
in essence, a termination of parental rights. Id. at 156. As such, the Court declared the statute 
unconstitutional because it “circumvents the constitutional requirement that a natural parent’s rights in 
his child may not be terminated absent a showing, by clear and convincing evidence, of his unfitness.” 
Id. at 156. 
 67. Nix, 225 S.E.2d at 307. 
 68. Id. at 307–08. 
 69. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); In re Baby Girl Eason, 358 S.E.2d 459 (Ga. 
1987). While a putative father who has demonstrated his commitment to his child through assuming 
some parental responsibilities may rightly claim an interest in the parent–child relationship warranting 
protection under the due process clause, “the mere existence of a biological link does not merit 
equivalent constitutional protection.” Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261. A putative father’s right to develop a 
relationship with his child exists through biology but may be abandoned if not asserted timely. Eason, 
358 S.E.2d at 462; see also Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392 (1979). Although a statute denying 
14
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father has abandoned his interest in developing a relationship with his 
child, both courts have affirmed that this interest requires due process 
protections in proceedings where it may be challenged.70 In Stanley v. 
Illinois, an Illinois statute authorized the Department of Human 
Resources to remove children from their putative father’s custody 
following their mother’s death without a hearing to determine his 
unfitness.71 Rejecting the State’s argument that the father lacked a 
constitutionally protected interest in his children given the absence of 
a legal relationship,72 the Court held the statute violated the Due 
Process Clause because it deprived the father of custody without an 
opportunity to demonstrate his fitness as a parent.73 
In Quilloin v. Walcott, the United States Supreme Court 
considered a putative father’s challenge to Georgia courts’ 
application of a best interests standard to determine whether he 
should be permitted to legitimate his child.74 In that case, a putative 
father who had never had custody of his son filed a petition to 
legitimate after receiving notice that the child’s stepfather had filed a 
petition to adopt the child.75 The trial court applied a best interests 
                                                                                                                 
any father of a child born out of wedlock the right to withhold consent to the child’s adoption violates 
the Equal Protection Clause, in cases where a father has abandoned his child, the Equal Protection 
Clause would not preclude the state from withholding this privilege. Id. 
 70. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); 
Clark v. Wade, 544 S.E.2d 99, 108 (Ga. 2001) (requiring a clear and convincing standard of proof in a 
custody dispute between the biological father of child born out of wedlock and the child’s 
grandparents); Eason, 358 S.E.2d at 463. 
 71. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646 (“Under Illinois law, the children of unwed fathers become wards of the 
State upon the death of the mother. Accordingly, upon [their mother’s] death, in a dependency 
proceeding instituted by the State of Illinois, Stanley’s children were declared wards of the State and 
placed with court-appointed guardians.” (footnote omitted)). 
 72. Id. at 652 (“‘To say that the test of equal protection should be the ‘legal’ rather than the 
biological relationship is to avoid the issue. For the Equal Protection Clause necessarily limits the 
authority of a State to draw such ‘legal’ lines as it chooses.’” (quoting Glona v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. 
Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75–76 (1968))). 
 73. Id. at 658. The Court found the State’s argument that its interest in judicial efficiency warranted 
a presumption of unfitness for all unwed fathers to be a wholly inadequate justification for denying the 
putative father due process in light of his substantial interest in keeping his family intact. Id. Moreover, 
the Court found that the statute also violated the Equal Protection Clause because it applied unilaterally 
to unwed fathers. Id. at 652. 
 74. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 247. 
 75. Id. Under Georgia law, an un-legitimated father has no power to contest an adoption of his child 
but may acquire the authority to veto the adoption if he legitimates his child within the statutory time 
frame. Id. Notably, the father in Quilloin had never lived with his child and was not seeking custody but 
instead only sought an order of legitimation to prevent the child from being adopted by his stepfather. 
15
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standard to deny the legitimation petition and grant the stepfather’s 
adoption.76 The Court found that applying a best interests standard 
under the facts presented did not violate due process.77 The Court 
began by reaffirming Stanley’s holding that a parent’s relationship 
with his or her child is constitutionally protected,78 but nonetheless 
found that where the effect of a legitimation petition would be to give 
legal recognition to a “family unit already in existence,” a best 
interests standard was adequate.79 Nonetheless, the Court cautioned 
that due process would be offended if the “State were to attempt to 
force the breakup of a natural family” simply because it was thought 
to be in the child’s best interests.80 
Similarly, in In re Baby Girl Eason, the Georgia Supreme Court 
held that where the state plays a role in limiting a father’s opportunity 
to develop a relationship with his child, absent a showing that he has 
abandoned his opportunity to do so, a best interests standard may not 
constitutionally be applied to deny his petition for legitimation.81 
Although in Eason the child’s mother had placed the child for 
adoption through a private agency, the court found that because the 
adoption was being pursued through state courts pursuant to state 
adoption laws, state participation was significant enough to require 
the court to examine the legitimation petition under a parental fitness, 
rather than best interests, standard.82 
                                                                                                                 
Id. at 255. By contrast, the child’s stepfather had lived with the child for nine years before initiating the 
adoption petition, and the child himself indicated a desire to be adopted by his stepfather. Id. at 247, 
251. Although the mother acknowledged that the putative father had visited the child from time to time 
and had brought him presents, she testified that the visits tended to have a disruptive effect on the child. 
Id. at 251. 
 76. Id. at 247. 
 77. Id. at 256. 
 78. Id. at 255 (“We have recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship between parent and 
child is constitutionally protected.” (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972))). 
 79. Id. at 255. 
 80. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255 (quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862–63 
(1977)). The Court also stressed that the putative father in this case had never had or sought legal 
custody of his child and that this was not a case where the proposed adoption would place the child with 
an adoptive family with whom he had never lived. Id. 
 81. In re Baby Girl Eason, 358 S.E.2d 459, 463 (Ga. 1987). 
 82. Id. Additionally, the court noted that even though the adoptive parents had developed a 
relationship with the child and the father had not, given the child’s age (nine months) and the delay 
created by the adoption proceedings, the court could not determine on the record whether the father had 
abandoned his interest in developing a relationship with his daughter. Id. 
16
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C. Right To Counsel In Legitimation Proceedings In Georgia 
Juvenile Courts 
While the Georgia and United States Supreme Courts have 
delineated specific procedural safeguards applicable in different 
types of parental rights cases,83 neither court has articulated a clear 
standard regarding a putative father’s right to counsel in legitimation 
proceedings. The Supreme Court has not considered the issue, and 
the few Georgia cases that examine whether such a right exists reflect 
contrasting positions.84 In Wilkins v. Department of Human 
Resources, the Georgia Supreme Court considered a putative father’s 
claim that he was entitled to representation in a juvenile court hearing 
to establish his paternity and terminate his parental rights.85 The 
putative father appeared at a hearing on DFCS’s petition to terminate 
his parental rights on grounds that he had abandoned the child.86 As 
permitted under then-existing law, Wilkins sought to establish his 
paternity so that he could be afforded a right to be heard in the 
termination proceeding.87 Although he appeared without counsel, the 
juvenile court failed to inquire, as required by statute, whether 
Wilkins was aware of his right to counsel.88 Finding that Wilkins 
                                                                                                                 
 83. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392 
(1979); Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 246; Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Clark v. Wade, 544 S.E.2d 
99 (Ga. 2001); Eason, 358 S.E.2d at 463. 
 84. See Wilkins v. Ga. Dep’t of Human Res., 337 S.E.2d 20 (Ga. 1985); In re S.M.G., 643 S.E.2d 
296 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007); Alexander v. Guthrie, 454 S.E.2d 805, 806 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995); discussion 
infra Part II.C. 
 85. Wilkins, 337 S.E.2d at 20. 
 86. Id. at 20–21. 
 87. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-52(b), repealed in 1986, provided: 
[i]f the paternity of a child born out of wedlock has been established in a judicial 
proceeding to which the father was a party prior to the filing of the petition [to terminate 
parental rights], the father shall be served with summons as provided by this chapter. 
Such father has the right to be heard unless he has relinquished all paternal rights with 
reference to the child. The putative father of the child whose paternity has not been so 
established, upon proof of his paternity of the child, may appear in the proceedings and 
be heard. 
O.C.G.A. § 15-11-52(b) (1981) (emphasis added), repealed by 1986 Ga. Laws 1017, § 3, construed in 
Wilkins v. Ga. Dep’t of Human Res., 337 S.E.2d 20, 21–22 (Ga. 1985). 
 88. Wilkins, 337 S.E.2d at 21. The requirement that the court undertake such an inquiry was 
established under Georgia Code section 15-11-30(b), which provided that “[i]f a party appears [in a 
deprivation proceeding] without counsel, the court shall ascertain whether he knows of his right to 
counsel and to be provided with counsel by the court if he is an indigent person.” Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. 
§ 15-11-30(b) (1981), repealed by 1986 Ga. Laws 1017, § 3). 
17
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failed to demonstrate paternity, the court proceeded to terminate his 
parental rights.89 Wilkins appealed, arguing that the trial court’s 
failure to inform him of his right to appointed counsel in the paternity 
proceeding required reversal of the termination.90 
Affirming the judgment and holding Wilkins was not entitled to 
representation, the Court of Appeals reasoned that an indigent 
putative father who has not demonstrated interest in parenting his 
child has a diminished right to representation in termination 
proceedings.91 Expressly rejecting this line of reasoning, the Georgia 
Supreme Court held that in determining whether a putative father is 
entitled to representation in termination proceedings, the critical 
inquiry is not whether he acted as a father to the child but rather 
whether he is a party to the proceedings within the meaning of the 
Georgia Juvenile Code.92 
The court found that Wilkins clearly qualified as an indigent 
“party” to the paternity proceeding as defined under Georgia law93 
and that as such, he was entitled to court-appointed counsel “at all 
stages of any proceedings alleging . . . [inter alia] deprivation.”94 
Because the Code required that a putative father establish paternity as 
a prerequisite to challenging a termination action, the court found the 
hearing to establish paternity was “clearly . . . a stage of [the] 
termination proceeding,” and that as a party the putative father was 
entitled to representation in the hearing to establish his paternity.95 
                                                                                                                 
 89. Id. at 20, 21. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Notably, the court also rejected the Department of Human Resources’ contention that Wilkins 
was not entitled to present evidence to establish his paternity because he was not the putative father of a 
child born “out of wedlock.” Id. at 21. Because the mother of Wilkins’ child was married to another man 
when the child was born, the court acknowledged that Georgia Code section 19-7-20 created a 
presumption of legitimacy in the mother’s husband. Id. at 23. However, the court found that in the 
context of termination of parental rights proceedings, the putative father was entitled to present evidence 
to rebut that presumption. Id. 
 93. Wilkins, 337 S.E.2d at 24. The court explained the term “party” is broadly defined in Georgia 
law as “one who is directly interested in the subject matter of the litigation,” and is entitled to present 
evidence and “appeal from the judgment.” Id. The court found that in the context of a paternity hearing 
brought in conjunction with a juvenile court TPR proceeding, a putative father “clearly falls within 
[this] . . . definition.” Id. 
 94. Id. at 21 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30(b) (1981), repealed by 1986 Ga. Laws 1017, § 3). 
 95. Id. at 24. Moreover, the court expressly noted that because Georgia Code section 15-11-52(b) 
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Although the Georgia Juvenile Code has undergone several 
revisions since Wilkins,96 the revisions have not resulted in such a 
substantive change that Wilkins’ holding should cease to apply. Two 
primary differences distinguish the Code sections examined in 
Wilkins and the version currently in force.97 First, under the statute 
examined in Wilkins, the parents’ right to counsel in termination 
proceedings was implied under the general provision extending the 
right to parties at all stages of deprivation proceedings.98 Although 
the current Code still contains a virtually identical provision,99 an 
added provision explicitly extends the right to parents in termination 
of parental rights proceedings.100 
The other difference is that while former Georgia Code section 15-
11-52(b) granted a putative father the right to “appear” and “be 
heard” in termination proceedings after presenting proof of 
paternity,101 the current Code imposes the more stringent requirement 
that a putative father succeed in a legitimation action to obtain 
standing to contest a termination.102 The current Juvenile Code also 
                                                                                                                 
imposed a burden on the putative father to establish his paternity as a prerequisite to challenging a 
termination of his parental rights, the paternity hearing is a “decisive” stage of a termination proceeding 
at which the putative father “has a critical need for legal representation.” Id. 
 96. GA. APPLESEED CTR. FOR LAW & JUSTICE, COMMON WISDOM: MAKING THE CASE FOR A NEW 
GEORGIA JUVENILE CODE 19 (2008) [hereinafter COMMON WISDOM], available at 
http://www.gaappleseed.org/children/reports/summary.pdf. 
 97. Compare O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30(b) (1981), and id. § 15-11-52(b), repealed by 1986 Ga. Laws 
1017, § 3, with O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-96(i), 15-11-98 (2012). 
 98. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30(b) (1981). 
 99. Former Georgia Code section 15-11-30(b) has been renumbered and appears in virtually 
identical form in current Georgia Code section 15-11-6(b), which reads as follows: 
Except as otherwise provided under this article, a party is entitled to representation by 
legal counsel at all stages of any proceedings alleging delinquency, unruliness, 
incorrigibility, or deprivation and if, as an indigent person, a party is unable to employ 
counsel, he or she is entitled to have the court provide counsel for him or her. If a party 
appears without counsel, the court shall ascertain whether such party knows of his or her 
right to counsel and to be provided with counsel by the court if he or she is an indigent 
person. 
O.C.G.A. § 15-11-6(b) (2012). Aside from minor semantic revisions, the only change is the addition of 
proceedings alleging “incorrigibility” to the list of those entitling a party to counsel. Compare id., with 
O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30(b) (1981). 
 100. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-98(b) (2012). 
 101. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-52(b) (1981), repealed by 1986 Ga. Laws 1017, § 3. Presumably, as 
demonstrated in Wilkins, the putative father was entitled to make such a showing at any time prior to the 
termination action. Wilkins v. Ga. Dep’t of Human Res., 337 S.E.2d 20, 24 (Ga. 1985). 
 102. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-96(i) (2012). To demonstrate paternity under Georgia Code section 15-11-
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imposes additional requirements that the father file both a petition for 
legitimation and notice of the petition with the juvenile court within 
thirty days of receiving a summons.103 Given the legislature’s intent 
to ensure parents’ right to counsel in termination proceedings,104 it is 
counterintuitive that a revision increasing a father’s burden of proof 
could be read to diminish his right to counsel. 
The Georgia Supreme Court has not considered a father’s right to 
counsel in legitimation proceedings under the current Juvenile Code. 
Although Wilkins has not been overruled, the Georgia Court of 
Appeals decisions considering the issue of representation in 
legitimation proceedings have increasingly departed from its 
holding.105 
In Alexander v. Guthrie, the Court of Appeals considered whether 
a putative father is entitled to court-appointed representation in the 
context of legitimation proceedings brought in superior court.106 In 
Alexander, an indigent putative father filed a pro se petition to 
legitimate his child after receiving notification that the child’s mother 
had consented to an adoption by the child’s stepfather.107 On appeal 
                                                                                                                 
52(b), the putative father needed only provide proof that he was the child’s biological father. O.C.G.A. 
§ 15-11-52(b) (1981), repealed by 1986 Ga. Laws 1017, § 3. Because current law requires that a father 
legitimate his child to obtain standing to contest a termination, O.C.G.A. § 15-11-96(i) (2012), in 
addition to proving his biological paternity, the putative father must demonstrate that he has not 
abandoned his opportunity interest in developing a relationship with his child and that he is not an unfit 
parent. See, e.g., In re Baby Girl Eason, 358 S.E.2d 459 (Ga. 1987). 
 103. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-96(i) (2012). 
 104. Nix v. Dep’t of Human Res., 225 S.E.2d 306, 307–08 (Ga. 1976) (“It is thus quite evident that 
the entire legislative scheme written into the pertinent provisions of the Juvenile Code was intended to 
provide to an indigent parent effective representation at all stages of any proceeding involving the 
termination of that parent’s right to his or her child.”). 
 105. See In re J.S., 691 S.E.2d 250 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (holding an indigent putative father was not 
entitled to court-appointed counsel to represent him in juvenile court legitimation proceedings); In re 
S.M.G., 643 S.E.2d 296 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (declining to consider a father’s contention that he was 
entitled to representation to enable him to initiate a legitimation action in juvenile court because he 
failed to raise the issue at the lower court level); Alexander v. Guthrie, 454 S.E.2d 805, 806 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1995) (holding an indigent putative father had no right to court-appointed counsel in a legitimation 
proceeding brought in superior court). 
 106. Alexander, 454 S.E.2d at 805. 
 107. Absent a handful of statutory exceptions, prior to a child’s adoption, a putative father’s rights 
must be terminated either in juvenile court (typically the culmination of a deprivation action brought by 
the State) or in superior court (typically in private adoptions where deprivation is not an issue). 
O.C.G.A. § 19-8-10 (2010). While a father who has not legitimated has no standing to contest a 
termination regardless of whether a father’s rights are terminated in superior court or juvenile court, the 
termination procedures are dealt with in separate portions of the code. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2 (2012) 
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from the trial court’s denial of his legitimation petition, the putative 
father contended that the trial court erred in failing to provide him 
with court-appointed counsel.108 Despite its implicit admission that 
Wilkins might be read to suggest otherwise,109 the court, without 
explaining its reasoning, held that the putative father “was not 
entitled to have an attorney appointed to represent him at public 
expense in the legitimation proceedings.”110  Although the court 
failed to articulate a justification for distinguishing Wilkins, because 
the holding in Wilkins was based on the right to counsel afforded to 
parties in a deprivation proceeding as established by the Georgia 
Juvenile Code,111 Wilkins arguably would not apply to a legitimation 
proceeding brought in superior court that was unconnected to a 
deprivation action.112 In fact, just ten months later, in Ghrist v. 
Fricks, when considering a putative father’s right to present evidence 
to establish his paternity in a superior court legitimation hearing, the 
Georgia Court of Appeals expressly distinguished Wilkins on the 
ground that it involved a termination case brought in juvenile court 
and was decided pursuant to the Juvenile Code.113 
                                                                                                                 
(governing termination of parental rights in juvenile court); id. § 15-11-98 (requiring putative father 
legitimate in order to have standing to contest termination proceedings in juvenile court); O.C.G.A. 
§ 19-8-11 (2010) (specifying procedure for termination of parental rights in superior court); id. § 19-8-
12 (requiring putative father to legitimate in order to have standing to contest termination proceedings in 
superior court). 
 108. Alexander, 454 S.E.2d at 806. 
 109. Id. at 806–07. 
 110. Id. at 806. 
 111. Wilkins v. Ga. Dep’t of Human Res., 337 S.E.2d 20, 21 (Ga. 1985) (construing O.C.G.A. § 15-
11-30(b) (1981) and O.C.G.A. § 15-11-52(b) (1981), repealed by 1986 Ga. Laws 1017, § 3). 
 112. Alexander, 454 S.E.2d 805; see also Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (requiring 
heightened procedural safeguards where the State interfered with a putative father’s relationship with his 
child). 
 113. Ghrist v. Fricks, 465 S.E.2d 501, 506 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995), overruled in part by Brine v. Shipp, 
729 S.E.2d 393, 396–397 (Ga. 2012). In holding that collateral estoppel prevented a putative father from 
presenting evidence to establish his paternity and legitimate a child who already had another legal father 
in a superior court proceeding, the court distinguished Wilkins as follows: 
[Wilkins] was a termination case brought in juvenile court and the Supreme Court’s 
decision was based upon OCGA § 15-11-52(b) . . . . As discussed . . . below, the instant 
case was not, despite its denomination as such, a termination of parental rights case. 
Moreover, the circumstances presented and interests sought to be protected are clearly 
different in this case. 
Id. at 506. 
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Since Alexander, the Court of Appeals has only considered an 
indigent putative father’s right to court-appointed counsel in juvenile 
court legitimation proceedings on two occasions, but on neither 
occasion did the court find that the putative father was entitled to 
counsel.114 Perhaps surprisingly, the issue was not raised on appeal 
until 2007 in In re S.M.G.115 In that case, the Court of Appeals 
declined to examine the merit of a father’s contention that a 
termination of his parental rights must be reversed because the 
juvenile court failed to provide him with counsel to legitimate his 
children.116 Although shortly after the termination petition was filed, 
the court appointed an attorney to represent the father in the 
termination proceeding, the record revealed no evidence that the 
father or his attorney made any attempt to file a legitimation petition 
before the deadline or that either requested funds for that purpose.117 
Although the S.M.G. court reasoned that it could not examine the 
denial of counsel claim on appeal because it was not raised at the 
lower level, this reasoning seemingly contradicts Wilkins, where the 
court decided that the putative father was entitled to counsel despite 
his failure to request it.118 Nonetheless, Wilkins is likely 
distinguishable from S.M.G. because the statute requiring a father to 
file a petition to legitimate differs from the statute examined in 
Wilkins.119 
In In re J.S., the only Georgia appellate case to directly consider 
the issue of a putative father’s right to counsel in juvenile court 
legitimation proceedings, the Court of Appeals cited Alexander for 
the proposition that an indigent father seeking to establish paternity 
                                                                                                                 
 114. In re J.S., 691 S.E.2d 250, 251 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010); In re S.M.G., 643 S.E.2d 296 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2007). 
 115. In re S.M.G., 643 S.E.2d at 296. 
 116. Id. at 297. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Wilkins v. Ga. Dep’t of Human Res., 337 S.E.2d 20, 24 (Ga. 1985). 
 119. Unlike the paternity statute in Wilkins, which simply entitled a putative father to present 
evidence to establish his paternity in conjunction with a termination of his parental rights, Georgia Code 
section 15-11-98 requires that a putative father initiate the legitimation action by filing a notice and a 
petition. Compare O.C.G.A. § 15-11-98 (2012), with O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30(b) (1981). Under this 
scheme, it is logical that a court would not appoint counsel to represent a father in legitimation 
proceedings until he has taken some action to initiate those proceedings. 
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and legitimate his child in conjunction with a juvenile court 
termination action has no right to court-appointed counsel.120 
However, the court failed to articulate why Alexander, rather than 
Wilkins, should apply.121 As in J.S., Wilkins examined the right to 
counsel in the context of a juvenile court paternity proceeding 
governed by Article 15 of the Georgia Code, where the State sought 
to terminate a father’s parental rights.122 Alexander, on the other 
hand, was decided in the context of a private adoption by the child’s 
stepfather, governed by Article 19 of the Georgia Code, where the 
State was not involved.123 Given this distinction, along with the 
amplified need for due process protections in cases where the State is 
an actor,124 it seems that the court’s reliance on Alexander in the 
context of juvenile court legitimation proceedings was misplaced. 
Applying procedural standards intended to govern litigation between 
private parties to cases where the State seeks to deprive individuals 
of their parental rights, as the court did in J.S., appears to run afoul of 
Fourteenth Amendment principles. 
III. ESTABLISHING FATHERS’ RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN GEORGIA 
JUVENILE COURT LEGITIMATION PROCEEDINGS 
To ensure putative fathers receive constitutionally adequate 
protection where the state seeks to sever relationships with their 
children, Georgia law should be amended to prevent juvenile courts 
from denying legitimation petitions brought by unrepresented, 
indigent fathers. 
A. The Nature Of The Right To Counsel 
Although legitimation proceedings brought in response to privately 
initiated adoption petitions and those brought to obtain standing to 
                                                                                                                 
 120. In re J.S., 691 S.E.2d 250, 252 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Wilkins, 337 S.E.2d at 24. 
 123. Alexander v. Guthrie, 454 S.E.2d 805 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995). 
 124. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972); In 
re Baby Girl Eason, 358 S.E.2d 459, 463 (Ga. 1987). 
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challenge state-initiated terminations of parental rights are decided in 
different courts,125 their potential impact on the putative father’s 
relationship with his child is virtually identical. In both instances, a 
denial of the petition eliminates a father’s right to assert any 
relationship interest in his child or to challenge an adoption.126 
Nonetheless, in juvenile court legitimation proceedings, this interest 
requires greater constitutional protection because of the state’s direct 
role in extinguishing the relationship.127 
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall deprive a 
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.128 
Because parents’ right to custody of their children is a liberty interest 
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment,129 the critical 
                                                                                                                 
 125. Georgia Code section 19-7-22 provides: 
A father of a child born out of wedlock may render his relationship with the child 
legitimate by petitioning the superior court of the county of the residence of the child’s 
mother or other party having legal custody . . . of the child . . . . [However, a] legitimation 
petition may be filed, pursuant to paragraph (2) of subsection (e) of Code Section 15-11-
28, in the juvenile court of the county in which a deprivation proceeding regarding the 
child is pending. 
O.C.G.A. §§ 19-7-22(a), (d) (2010); see also O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28 (e)(2) (2012) (“The juvenile court 
shall have jurisdiction to hear any legitimation petition filed pursuant to Code Section 19-7-22 as to a 
child with respect to whom a deprivation proceeding is pending in the juvenile court at the time the 
legitimation petition is filed.”). 
 126. Georgia Code section 19-8-12(f)(3)—articulating consequences of a denied legitimation petition 
filed in response to a privately initiated adoption petition in superior court—is identical to Georgia Code 
section 15-11-96(i)(3)—articulating consequences of a denied legitimation petition filed in response to a 
state-initiated motion to terminate parental rights in juvenile court. Compare O.C.G.A. § 19-8-12(f)(3) 
(2010), with id. § 15-11-96(i)(3) (2012). Both Code sections provide that after receiving notice of the 
motion or petition: 
A biological father who is not the legal father loses all rights to the child and . . . may not 
thereafter object to the [child’s] adoption . . . if . . . he . . . [f]iles a legitimation petition 
and the action is subsequently concluded without a court order declaring a finding that he 
is the legal father of the child. 
O.C.G.A. § 15-11-96(i) (2012); O.C.G.A.§ 19-8-12(f) (2010). 
 127. See Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255; discussion infra Part II.B. 
 128. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Supreme Court has found that the Fourteenth Amendment 
imposes both procedural and substantive due process requirements in cases involving parents’ right to 
custody of their children. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (imposing a procedural 
due process requirement that evidence supporting termination of parental rights be proved by clear and 
convincing evidence); Stanley, 405 U.S. 645 (articulating a substantive due process requirement that the 
State prove terminating a father’s custody is necessary to achieving a compelling government purpose). 
 129. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cnty., 452 U.S. 18 (1981). A parent’s right to raise 
his or her child free from state interference “has been viewed as a fundamental liberty interest worthy of 
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 38 (quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 
U.S. 816, 845 (1977)). 
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distinction between the degree of due process required in cases such 
as Alexander, where a father seeks to challenge a privately initiated 
adoption,130 and Wilkins, where a father seeks to challenge a 
termination initiated by the Department,131 is state action. 
Traditionally, the Fourteenth Amendment has been interpreted as a 
limitation on government action as opposed to private conduct.132 
Although much debate has ensued as to whether, and in what 
circumstances, the Fourteenth Amendment applies to private actors 
who challenge other individuals’ liberty or property interests through 
state courts,133 it is well-settled that due process is required when a 
government entity, such as DFCS, seeks to divest an individual of a 
protected liberty interest.134 Hence, in legitimation and termination of 
parental rights cases where the state is a party, parental rights 
unquestionably require constitutional protection.135 
Although the Supreme Court has occasionally found that court 
enforcement of private claims constitutes state action requiring 
Fourteenth Amendment protection, the principle has not been 
consistently applied, possibly because of the potential for 
characterizing all private conduct as state action.136 As to legitimation 
claims, on at least one occasion, the Georgia Supreme Court found 
that pursuing a privately initiated adoption through state courts 
                                                                                                                 
 130. Wilkins v. Ga. Dep’t of Human Res., 337 S.E.2d 20, 21(Ga. 1985). 
 131. Alexander v. Guthrie, 454 S.E.2d 805, 806 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995). 
 132. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 519–51 (4th ed. 
2011). 
 133. Id. at 557–58. Under the “entanglement exception” to the state action doctrine, the Fourteenth 
Amendment applies where the state “affirmatively authorizes, encourages, or facilitates private 
conduct.” Id. at 539. In Shelley v. Kraemer, the Supreme Court held that “the ‘action of state courts . . . 
is . . . regarded as action of the State within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.’” Id. at 540 
(footnote omitted) (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948)). Shelley has incited controversy 
as to the limits of the state action doctrine, and while the Court has rarely applied Shelley in subsequent 
cases, it has also failed to “articulate[] any clear limiting principles.” Id. at 540–41. 
 134. See, e.g., In re H.L.T., 298 S.E.2d 33, 33 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982). Emphasizing the gravity of a 
juvenile court’s order granting DFCS’s motion to terminate a mother’s parental rights, the Georgia 
Court of Appeals observed that “‘[f]ew forms of state action are both so severe and so irreversible.’” Id. 
at 33 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)). 
 135. See, e.g., In re B.N.A., 546 S.E.2d 819, 820 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (finding that the State’s failure 
to prove parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence in a termination proceeding was a violation 
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requiring reversal); In re H.L.T., 298 S.E.2d at 
33. 
 136. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 132, at 523, 540. 
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pursuant to state law was significant enough to entitle the father to 
enhanced procedural safeguards.137 However, the United States 
Supreme Court has recognized a clear distinction, finding that 
legitimation proceedings brought for the purpose of obtaining 
standing to challenge privately initiated adoptions require less 
stringent due process protections than those brought for the purpose 
of obtaining standing to challenge state-initiated terminations of 
parental rights.138 
While the Court has stopped short of finding that due process 
requires appointment of counsel to indigent parents in every 
termination case, in this context, it has encouraged states to impose 
more rigorous due process requirements than are minimally 
permissible under the Constitution.139 Accordingly, the Georgia 
legislature has imposed a statutory right to counsel in juvenile court 
termination proceedings.140 Deferring to the legislative judgment on 
the issue, reviewing courts have refused to condone some judicially 
imposed limitations on the right, even when not expressly prohibited 
by statute.141 Juvenile courts have accordingly been prevented from 
utilizing statutory loopholes to undermine the purpose of the 
requirement.142 
Unfortunately, reviewing courts have failed to apply the same 
logic to juvenile courts’ denial of counsel in legitimation 
proceedings.143 This practice is plainly incompatible with the 
                                                                                                                 
 137. In re Baby Girl Eason, 358 S.E.2d 459, 463 (Ga. 1987); discussion infra Part II.B. 
 138. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); see also discussion infra Part II.B. 
 139. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cnty., 452 U.S. 18, 33–34 (1981). 
 140. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-98(b) (2012). 
 141. See, e.g., Nix v. Dep’t of Human Res., 225 S.E.2d 306, 308 (Ga. 1976); In re J.M.B., 676 S.E.2d 
9, 12 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (refusing to apply harmless error standard to court’s failure to ensure mother’s 
waiver of counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary); In re A.M.A., 607 S.E.2d 916, 923 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2004) (establishing that when a non-indigent parent appears without counsel at a termination 
proceeding, the juvenile court has a duty to delay the proceedings long enough to ascertain whether she 
has acted with reasonable diligence in retaining an attorney and whether her failure to procure counsel is 
due to factors beyond her control). 
 142. See, e.g., Nix, 225 S.E.2d at 307–08. In requiring a juvenile court to provide a mother with a 
pauperized transcript for the purposes of appeal despite the absence of an explicit statutory requirement, 
the Georgia Supreme Court observed that it was the legislature’s intent to effectuate due process in 
termination proceedings. Id. 
 143. See, e.g., In re J.S., 691 S.E.2d 250, 252 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010); In re S.M.G., 643 S.E.2d 296 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 2007). But see In re B.N.A., 546 S.E.2d 819, 820 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (reversing termination of 
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legislature’s goal of protecting parents’ right to due process in 
termination proceedings.144 While in private proceedings, distinctions 
may allow courts to treat estranged putative fathers differently from 
mothers who have established relationships with their children,145 
such distinctions are far less justified when the mother’s conduct has 
been so egregious that she has lost custody to the state.146 Moreover, 
in legitimation proceedings, where the burden of proof is on the 
putative father to establish biological paternity and parental fitness, 
denying counsel may create an even greater disadvantage than in 
termination proceedings, where the state has the burden of proof.147 
B. Establishing A Father’s Right To Counsel In Juvenile Court 
Legitimation Proceedings 
To prohibit additional infringements on putative fathers’ 
Fourteenth Amendment rights, Georgia courts need a clear standard 
requiring court-appointed counsel in juvenile court legitimation 
proceedings. Given Georgia courts’ failure to develop and apply 
consistent standards,148 the General Assembly should amend the 
Juvenile Code to provide a statutory basis for the right. However, in 
light of the substantial budgetary constraints plaguing Georgia 
                                                                                                                 
a putative father’s parental rights despite his failure to legitimate, where the Department failed to 
prepare a case plan for reunification pursuant to court order). 
 144. See Wilkins v. Ga. Dep’t of Human Res., 337 S.E.2d 20, 24 (Ga. 1985). 
 145. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262, 267–68 (1983) (“If one parent has an established custodial 
relationship with the child and the other parent has either abandoned or never established a relationship, 
the Equal Protection Clause does not prevent a state from according the two parents different legal 
rights.”); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 355–56 (1979) (finding unwed fathers who may remain 
anonymous to the state until taking action to legitimate their children are not “similarly situated” to 
unwed mothers for purposes of pursuing a wrongful death suit). 
 146. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 267. Statutes that treat putative fathers and mothers differently with respect to 
rights to veto an adoption “may not constitutionally be applied in that class of cases where the mother 
and father are in fact similarly situated with regard to their relationship with the child.” Id. But see In re 
V.M.T., 534 S.E.2d 452, 455 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). In In re V.M.T., the Georgia Court of Appeals 
consolidated appeals from juvenile court orders terminating the parental rights of both parents. Id. at 
454. After rejecting the putative father’s contention that requiring him to legitimate his child in order to 
obtain standing to contest a termination violates Fourteenth Amendment principles, the court affirmed 
termination of his parental rights and proceeded to consider the merits of the mother’s appeal. Id. 
 147. In re A.B., 579 S.E.2d 779, 780 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). In proceedings to terminate parental rights, 
the State has the burden to prove parental misconduct or inability by clear and convincing evidence. Id. 
 148. See In re J.S., 691 S.E.2d 250; discussion infra Part II.C. 
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juvenile courts,149 to the extent feasible, the statute should be tailored 
to remedy the specific issue of denying counsel in legitimation 
proceedings that could actually result in a de facto termination of 
parental rights. 
1. Budgetary Constraints and Denial of Counsel 
While inadequate funding of juvenile courts is hardly a new 
problem, decreased tax revenue resulting from the current recession 
has exacerbated the issue.150 Georgia juvenile courts are funded 
solely by county governments and in proceedings not involving 
delinquency, must pay for counsel for children and all indigent 
parties from the budget allocated to them by the county 
commissioner.151 This funding structure has the unfortunate 
consequence of intensifying the disparity of resources between poor 
and wealthy counties, so the counties that are most in need receive 
the smallest allocation of financial resources.152 Even in 
circumstances where an indigent party’s right to counsel is statutorily 
established, inadequate funding has forced many juvenile courts to 
cut corners that undermine the quality of the representation 
provided.153 
                                                                                                                 
 149. See generally Michele Benedetto Neitz, A Unique Bench, a Common Code: Evaluating Judicial 
Ethics in Juvenile Court, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 97, 115 (2011) (discussing the current recession’s 
impact on allocation of resources to juvenile courts). 
 150. See, e.g., Preston Sparks, Juvenile Court Cases on Rise County Adds Funding for Judge’s 
Position, AUGUSTA CHRON., June 1, 2006, at B2, available at 2006 WLNR 9452121. Unable to procure 
funding from the county in time to prevent a backlog of juvenile court cases, a part-time Columbia 
County juvenile court judge worked additional days without pay. Id.; see also Mike Buffington, Juvenile 
Court Gets a Little More Funding, BARROW J. (Sept. 15, 2011), http://www.barrowjournal.com/archives 
/5764-Juvenile-Court-get-a-little-more-funding.html. When Barrow County’s Board of Commissioners 
cut funding for indigent defense in half, the juvenile court was forced to request additional funding to 
cover the cost of providing counsel for indigent parents. Id. 
 151. Sarah Gerwig-Moore & Leigh S. Schrope, Hush, Little Baby, Don’t Say a Word: How Seeking 
the “Best Interests of the Child” Fostered a Lack of Accountability in Georgia’s Juvenile Courts, 58 
MERCER L. REV. 531, 536 (2007) (“Counties bear financial responsibility for funding counsel in 
juvenile deprivation matters . . . .”); Georgia’s County Governments, NEW GA. ENCYCLOPEDIA (Dec. 
20, 2011), http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/nge/Article.jsp?id=h-589. 
 152. See COMMON WISDOM, supra note 96, at 13. 
 153. MELINDA MOORE & ALLISON MCWILLIAMS, UNIV. OF GA., A STATEWIDE ASSESSMENT OF 
GEORGIA PARENT REPRESENTATION IN CHILD WELFARE PROCEEDINGS 4 (2010), available at 
http://w2.georgiacourts.org/cj4c/files/Final%20PA%20Merged%20Report.pdf. A statewide examination 
of available data on parent representation revealed that attorneys are frequently given little time to 
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Unsurprisingly, facing these practical challenges and in the 
absence of a statute creating a clear mandate, juvenile courts often 
decline to provide counsel to indigent fathers in legitimation 
proceedings.154 Moreover, denying legitimations produces an even 
greater cost benefit because it renders fathers unable to contest 
terminations of their parental rights.155 When a court denies a 
legitimation, it avoids the cost of providing counsel to an indigent 
fathers in subsequent termination proceedings, which are typically far 
lengthier and more complex than legitimation proceedings,156 and 
also decreases the length of termination proceedings—thereby 
decreasing the number of hours in court for all attorneys and court 
staff who must be present.157 With the odds already stacked against 
the indigent father who must, with no legal training, present a pro se 
case for legitimation, these circumstances incentivize juvenile courts 
to deny the legitimation. 
2. A Proposed Remedy 
To remedy this issue, the proposed statute must prevent courts 
from unfairly denying counsel in legitimation proceedings for the 
purpose of denying fathers the right to challenge terminations. 
However, because in reality only a small percentage of legitimation 
petitions are actually denied, it may be unrealistic to burden courts 
                                                                                                                 
prepare cases and often meet with clients for the first time in the courtroom. Id. at 3. Additionally, 
researchers found that low attorney pay and overall lack of funding for juvenile courts impacted the 
quality of representation parents received. Id.; see also 
Gerwig-Moore & Schrope, supra note 151, at 536 (explaining that in some circumstances, lack of 
adequate funding for Georgia juvenile courts has resulted in courts’ failing to appoint counsel for 
children in delinquency proceedings). 
 154. See, e.g., In re J.S., 691 S.E.2d 250, 251 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010); In re S.M.G., 643 S.E.2d 296, 296 
(Ga. Ct. App. 2007). 
 155. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-96(i)(2) (2012). 
 156. Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief for Amicus Curiae National Legal Aid 
and Defender Association, Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of Durham Cnty., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (No. 
79-6423), 1980 WL 340038, at *15 (“Proceedings to terminate parental rights are extremely complex. 
The statutory standards for the termination of parental rights . . . require the court to make its 
determination on the basis of complicated factual issues that require close analysis of human behavior.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 157. Courts typically conduct a single hearing regarding termination of parental rights of both parents. 
See, e.g., In re M.J.L., 643 S.E.2d 395 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007); In re T.W.O., 643 S.E.2d 255 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2007); In re C.P., 630 S.E.2d 165 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006). 
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with the additional cost of providing counsel for all indigent fathers 
in legitimation proceedings. To prevent obligating courts with an 
unwarranted burden, the statute should be narrowly tailored to 
address the specific harm in question. To accomplish this, the 
amended statute should prevent juvenile courts from denying 
legitimation petitions where the father is unrepresented. Although 
this approach would require juvenile courts to make a pretrial 
prediction as to whether they might deny the petition and appoint 
counsel even if denial is inevitable, it would require a lesser 
expenditure than an absolute requirement that courts appoint counsel 
in all legitimation cases. 
This proposed solution is similar to the “actual imprisonment” 
standard the United States Supreme Court has established in the 
criminal context.158 Recognizing that extending a constitutional right 
to counsel to all indigent criminal defendants would impose an undue 
financial burden on states, in Argersinger v. Hamlin, the Court held 
that states are only required to provide counsel if the defendant is 
sentenced to actual imprisonment.159 In response to subsequent 
criticism that the standard required judges to make predictive 
evaluations concerning whether imprisonment might be imposed, the 
Court defended the actual imprisonment standard as a “reasonably 
workable” solution in light of the “substantial[] costs” that a more 
inclusive standard would generate.160 
If courts are capable of making such pretrial determinations based 
largely on the character of the charged offense in criminal 
proceedings, juvenile courts should be competent to make similar 
pretrial determinations concerning legitimation petitions, as they 
have access to substantially more information than is available in the 
criminal context.161 Unlike in criminal proceedings, juvenile courts 
                                                                                                                 
 158. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 39–40 (1972). 
 159. Id. at 37 n.7 (noting that the actual imprisonment standard would not impose too great a burden 
on the “Nation’s legal resources”). 
 160. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979). 
 161. Case plans for reunification, which must be submitted to the court within thirty days of a child’s 
removal from the family home, provide substantial information about the family, including a statement 
of the reasons why the child cannot return safely to the home of either parent. See generally O.C.G.A. 
§ 15-11-58(b) (2012). At each subsequent permanency hearing, the Department must submit an 
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have access to social and psychological histories, as well as the 
child’s guardian ad litem’s recommendation regarding the petition.162 
Additionally, by the time a legitimation petition is filed, in most 
cases, juvenile courts will have received substantial information 
about the father’s relationship with his child through other 
hearings.163 Although this “actual denial” standard would prevent 
courts from denying legitimation petitions if they fail to provide 
counsel, courts could minimize this risk by appointing counsel 
whenever there is any doubt as to the whether the petition should be 
granted.164 Moreover, because the standard would not prevent a court 
from granting a subsequent termination of the father’s rights, even if 
a court was forced to grant a petition because of an inaccurate pretrial 
assessment, the error would not produce a substantive difference in 
the case’s ultimate outcome. 
CONCLUSION 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that parents have 
a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the care and custody of 
their children.165 Where the State seeks to terminate parental rights, 
Georgia law requires that juvenile courts appoint counsel to indigent 
parents to protect their right to due process.166 Although denying a 
putative father’s petition to legitimate his child amounts to a de facto 
termination of his parental rights, current precedent suggests juvenile 
courts have no obligation to provide counsel for indigent fathers in 
legitimation proceedings.167 Given the Georgia legislature’s 
determination that due process requires court-appointed counsel 
                                                                                                                 
additional report identifying an updated permanency recommendation for the child and explaining the 
reasoning behind this recommendation. Id. § 15-11-58(o)(2). 
 162. JOSLYN-GAUL, supra note 5, at 62. 
 163. See generally O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58 (2012) (identifying proceedings required to take place at 
each stage of a deprivation case). 
 164. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.2(a) 
(4th ed. 2004) (suggesting the same for criminal proceedings). 
 165. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). 
 166. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-98(b) (2012). 
 167. In re J.S., 691 S.E.2d 250, 250 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010). 
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when the State seeks to terminate the parent–child relationship,168 
depriving indigent fathers of counsel in juvenile court legitimation 
proceedings amounts to a constitutionally impermissible denial of 
due process. 
The Georgia Juvenile Code should be amended to create a clear 
standard preventing juvenile courts from denying indigent fathers’ 
legitimation petitions without providing counsel for the legitimation 
proceeding. To avoid creating an unnecessary financial burden on the 
courts, the legislature should consider a scheme that allows juvenile 
courts to grant, but not deny, legitimation petitions without 
appointing counsel for the father. 
                                                                                                                 
 168. Nix v. Dep’t of Human Res., 225 S.E.2d 306, 307–08 (Ga. 1976). 
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